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giving—he engages the reader in a prayerful reflection on what it means to 
be “made by God…like God…and for God” (p. 15).
Although internationally acclaimed as a nonviolent advocate for hu-
man rights, Tutu writes for the average person: people who continually 
have to choose how to respond with integrity to troubling and/or hurtful 
experiences at home, at work, or within their larger socio-cultural milieu. He 
exhorts the reader to adopt a “tend and befriend,” rather than the “fight or 
flight,” response of conventional wisdom—to meet the challenge and strive 
to resolve it in ways honoring the dignity of each person and fostering a mu-
tually life-giving relationship among them.
The book begins by grounding the claim that we are made for good-
ness within the Judeo-Christian tradition and describes the difference be-
tween trying to be good and choosing to do good. Particular attention is 
given to helping the reader learn how to manage the multiple and complex 
realities of repeatedly making that choice, even when our efforts challenged 
by adversity, hardship, doubt or failure. And, the final chapters invite the 
reader to cultivate prayer practices that nurture increased awareness of the 
nature of God and human being. The combined effect of the topics Tutu se-
lected for reflection and his accessible writing style is both inspiring and in-
structive. The reader is led to a deeper understanding of who Desmond Tutu 
is and how he remains true to his most authentic self. More importantly, the 
reader is carefully and compassionately led to a fuller embrace of his or her 
own self as an instrument of God’s infinite and unfailing goodness.
Eva Marie Lumas
Franciscan School of Theology
Berkeley, CA
John Bradshaw, Reclaiming Virtue: How We Can Develop the Moral In-
telligence to Do the Right Thing at the Right Time for the Right Reason 
(New York: Bantam, 2009), 528 pp.
John Bradshaw is an engaging writer having written four other books that 
were bestsellers, three of which were New York Times #1 Bestsellers. Reclaim-
ing Virtue is a largely autobiographical introduction to the subject of moral 
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formation by a psychotherapist who had once studied for the priesthood. it 
is Bradshaw’s own attempt at integrating the psychological theories he uti-
lizes in his practice with the traditions of moral theology.
i had two hopes for this book when i first picked it up: one hope per-
tained to this book’s potential for use as an introductory text in the seminary 
classroom; the other hope pertained to the interesting linkage between vir-
tue theory and psychology suggested by the book’s topic. This was probably 
too much to ask. Bradshaw does come close, though, but with mixed results 
for both of my expectations: meeting these pedagogical goals for seminar-
ians and addressing questions about the relationship between psychology 
and moral virtue. i’m still attracted to and intrigued by this book, but i’m 
also a little disappointed in it on both counts.
Reclaiming Virtue does seem to offer a promising bridge between virtue 
theory and contemporary models of psychology, but it tends to beg some 
of the questions raised by the relationship between the two. western virtue 
theory inherits a rich classical tradition about the formation of moral char-
acter, but much of the language about moral formation continues to be built 
upon the bedrock of classical Greek models of the self. The discipline of eth-
ics is challenged to speak meaningfully about moral character given newer 
models of the psyche.
The challenges to moral discourse from psychology are several, de-
pending on the psychological model being discussed. First, the more posi-
tivist and determinist approaches to psychology, such as behaviorism, social 
psychology, and physio-psychology make salient the perennial question of 
determinism versus free will. Given environmental, social, or biological de-
terminants of behavior, whence freedom and volition?
Second, non-directive and non-judgmental approaches to counseling 
and therapy, which form the foundation of much of the pastoral practice 
and the formational pedagogy for readers of this journal, make salient the 
question of the role of moral judgment and discernment in pastoral practice. 
Given the presumption of non-judgmentalism, how do we nurture people of 
discerning wisdom able to decide and act justly? in addition to the question, 
“whence freedom?” we would ask, “How normative?”
recent advances in cross-cultural psychology widen these questions 
to challenge the very way we conceptualize the “self” in general, as well as 
the “moral self” in particular. My own experience teaching both psychology 
and social ethics at the ecumenical Protestant Pacific Theological College in 
Fiji drove this home. My students were all from the more communal and 
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less individualistic cultures of Melanesia, Polynesia, and Micronesia. i was 
drawn to the distinctions made by scholars such as David Matsumoto and 
Hazel rose Markus between the “more independent self” of western cul-
tures and the “interdependent self” typical in many non-western cultures.1 
what is an individual moral self in the first place and how is it related to 
agentic others in a shared world of meaning?
How, then, does Bradshaw offer a conceptual link between contempo-
rary psychological models and conceptions of character formation and mor-
al virtue? what kind of bridge does he end up constructing?
Bradshaw draws on a wide variety of psychological theories in pre-
senting his own thought. Yet, he focuses on theories that posit a degree of 
freedom and volition. He does not attend in the same way to more deter-
ministic strains of thought. This is important for him both personally and 
professionally—personally in his own struggle against addictions and pro-
fessionally in his work to empower others.
His beginning point for conceptualizing our ability for moral choice, 
though, is Aristotle and Thomas Aquinas. He equates an Aristotelian notion 
of “right desire” with Martin Buber’s understanding of “grand will,”2 with 
Malcolm owen Slavin and Daniel kriegman’s idea of the “true self,”3 and 
with James Hillman’s understanding of “soul.”4 Bradshaw writes: “My true 
self, my soul, my grand will is where i feel alive, where i have the most en-
ergy, and where i seem to belong” (p. 317).
James Hillman, a Jungian analyst, was the first director of studies at the 
Jung institute in Zurich. known for his “acorn theory” that he describes in 
his book, The Soul’s Code, Hillman argued that “our calling in life is inborn 
and that it’s our mission in life to realize its imperatives.”5 Bradshaw also 
discusses Carl Jung’s understanding of the shadow side of personality with 
reference to the distinction Bradshaw draws between “true self” and “false 
self.” The shadow, according to Bradshaw, “includes the repression of the 
true self” (p. 252). “Making the shadow conscious,” he continues, “is a pre-
condition of prudence” (p. 254). The claiming and integration of the positive 
side of one’s shadow is a part of the process of discovering one’s true self, 
which Bradshaw also calls “the recovery of innocence” (p. 261). Bradshaw 
begins the concluding section of his chapter on shadow work with this de-
scription of the true self: “Each of us has a true self that holds the positive 
powers and talents we were born with and makes us the unique, unrepeat-
able people we are” (p. 267).
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The actual phrase, “true self,” is drawn from Malcolm owen Slavin 
and Daniel kriegman’s book, The Adaptive Design of the Human Psyche. Slavin 
and kriegman, however, are not Jungians and they cite neither Hillman nor 
Jung in their book. rather Slavin and kriegman draw from two very different 
streams of thought. one stream is a line of development of psychoanalytic 
theory represented by Donald woods winnicott,6 Heinz kohut,7 and Chris-
topher Bollas.8
The other stream of thought is evolutionary theory, which has its gen-
esis with Darwin. Part i of Slavin and kriegman’s book is focused primarily 
on evolutionary theory. The book begins with the question about “wheth-
er psychoanalytic notions about the seemingly irrational, conflict-filled na-
ture of the human mind could be reconciled with the Darwinian search for 
the fundamentally adaptive designs that govern all living creatures.”9 They 
draw on winnicott’s notion of the “true self” to posit such an evolutionary 
adaptive design of the human psyche. Slavin and kriegman explain:
in this view of the development and maintenance of intrapsychic struc-
ture, the basic (universal) organization of the self and its motives will be 
seen as an individual’s elaboration of a universal, innate, human strategy 
for negotiating universal relational dilemmas in specific environmental con-
texts drawing on that índividual’s unique attributes.10
Slavin and kriegman’s definition of the “true self” thus incorporates univer-
sal as well as particular dimensions of the psyche, and it involves evolution-
ary phylogenic structures for the species as a whole as well as the ontogenic 
relational history of an individual. it is at once social as well as personal and 
of key importance is the fit of the self with the ongoing social context of the 
individual. i find this a very helpful model that can accommodate both an 
understanding of the more autonomous “independent” self characteristic of 
more individualist western cultures and that of the “interdependent” selves 
formed in more communal cultures.
Slavin and kriegman’s understanding of the true self would then seem 
to be saliently different from Bradshaw’s, which tends to elevate the individ-
ual beyond the influences (and confining determinants) of his or her social 
environment and biological heritage.
one place, though, where they do overlap in their conception of the “true 
self” is their respective appreciation for the work of Erik Erikson.11 Bradshaw 
draws heavily from Erikson. The book as a whole tends to move through Er-
ikson’s psychosocial crises with the emphases on the development of trust in 
early childhood and dealing with the potential for shame in a healthy rather 
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than a toxic manner. Bradshaw moves most explicitly into Erikson’s frame-
work, however, when he discusses the challenges of adulthood.
Echoing and amending Erikson, Bradshaw expands Erickson’s final 
three psychosocial crises of adulthood into four. Bradshaw refers to our 
“first career” as facing the challenge of “intimacy versus isolation” and de-
veloping the virtue of “love”—avoiding the extremes of “out-of-control 
lust” on the one hand or the vices of anger and jealousy on the other. Love, 
here, is the virtuous mean.
Bradshaw also considers the development of the virtue of work to be a 
part of adulthood’s “first career.” virtuous work is the result of successfully 
facing the challenge of “meaningful livelihood versus laziness,” avoiding the 
vicious extremes of sloth on the one hand, or avarice as “work addiction” on 
the other. virtuous work is here the mean.
For Bradshaw, our “second career” is similarly composed of the virtuous 
resolution of two psychosocial crises. “Generativity versus Self-Absorption” 
characterizes the struggle that results in the virtue of “Care, ”avoiding the vi-
cious extremes of gluttony on the one hand, or narcissistic pride on the other. 
Care is the virtuous mean.
The final challenge is to develop the virtue of wisdom as a result of facing 
the crisis of “ego-integrity (or self-love) versus Despair, avoiding the vicious 
extremes of resentful anger or regrets on the one hand, or envy on the other.
Throughout this process of living through these crises and developing 
virtuous capacities, the virtue of prudence as moral wisdom guides our choic-
es. Bradshaw is not as clear, however, as to how virtue can be contextualized 
to social situations and at the same time must unleash one’s “true self;” a 
self which transcends environmental constraint. Bradshaw is also unclear as 
to how virtue as the “mean” is consistent with the many stories of more ex-
treme heroism that he recounts as examples. Bradshaw’s work with Erikson, 
though, linking the ontogenic, relational development of self with a revised 
understanding of classical virtue theory, is both suggestive and constructive.
i experienced mixed results using Reclaiming Virtue in the class room. 
on the one hand this is a long book, but on the other hand, it is easy to read 
and engaging—at least it is engaging for native English speakers, but can be 
confusing if English is your ‘second’ language. on the one hand, it does offer 
a good introduction (but only an introduction) covering the bases of classical 
virtue theory, psychological theory, professional practice, nurturing people 
of virtue, and vocational discernment. on the other hand, this was as likely 
to be as confusing to students as helpful. For students, too much is presented 
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too quickly and not always systematically or logically. This book requires ex-
planation in the classroom—a challenge for lecturing. Every week in which 
there was an assignment from this book, i was challenged to explain and fill 
in the blanks where Bradshaw does not. Bradshaw writes more intuitively, 
associating more freely than logically from one topic to the next.
Reclaiming Virtue does provide a good example of the kind of integra-
tion between psychology and virtue theory that i was hoping for, but too 
much too soon to help typical students integrate the material for their own 
life and work. it is nevertheless an engaging and suggestive book on this 
subject—one that i will continue to recommend (though not require) for stu-
dents and colleagues alike.
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